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NOTES AND COMMENT
would have a "much greater probitive force than when made by the
stockholder himself," in case of a dispute among the stockholders.
THOMAS W. HAYDEN
Fire Insurance; Standard Policy; Construction; Entirety of Policy;
Waiver and Estoppel
In a decision rendered January 8, 1929, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the case of C. J. Struebing v. American Insurance Company,
Newark, New Jersey, 222 N.W. 831, sustained the Wisconsin stand-
ard policy enacted in the year 1917, R. S. 203.01. The 1917 enactment
replaced the 1895 enactment of the standard fire policy. The 1895
policy was upheld in Temple v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 372,
85, N.W. 361; Bourgeois v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 606,
57 N.W. 38, in which the standard policy act was referred to as bring-
ing order out of chaos. Prior to its enactment, there were as many
different contracts of insurance as there were companies, and that the
standard policy is a step in the right direction is not to be doubted.
Under it there -could be practically only one form of policy. The
standard fire policy was held to be a statutory law as well as a contract,
and should be treated and construed accordingly; that it was the only
contract of insurance which the parties had the power to make, and
being the law as well as a contract, its provisions were binding upon
the parties.
The principal issue in the Struebing case concerned the 'other in-
surance' provision." "Unless provided by agreement in writing, added
hereto, this company shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring
(a) while the insured shall have any other contract. of insurance,
whether valid or not, on the property covered in whole or in part by
this policy."
November 22, 1922, defendant issued plaintiff a standard policy
of insurance against loss by fire, covering certain buildings and per-
sonal property. It was never provided by agreement in writing, as
required by said policy, that plaintiff might have other insurance.
March 26, 1926, plaintiff procured another policy of insurance from
the Theresa Mutual Fire Insurance Company covering personal prop-
erty on the premises covered by defendant's policy. On March 4, 1928,
the dwelling house covered by defendant's policy was wholly de-
stroyed by fire, and personal property then located therein was also
wholly destroyed.2
The court in quoting the other insurance provision of the policy
says: "There was no agreement in writing added to the policy author-
' Lines 32 to 37 inc. of the 1917 policy.
'In C. D. Struebing v. American Ins. Co., 22z N.W. 831.
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izing any other contract of insurance on the property covered in
whole or in part by the policy in the defendant company, and the plain-
tiff procured another policy of insurance from the Theresa Company
covering personal property on the premises covered by the defendant
policy, this would suspend the liability in the policy of the defendant."3
The ruling that the other insurance suspended the policy, follows
the same rule of suspension laid down in Blue Mounds Farm Supply
Co. v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Wis. 219 N.W. 357, where
it is said that "the doctrine with respect to suspension . . . . appears
to be in accordance with the tendency of modern judicial decisions
... . also in accordance with the provisions of the standard fire
policy of the state, which establishes the public policy of the state
generally." But, it appears the suspension conclusion is also reached
in determination and definition of the word while in the other in-
surance provision-that while means "during the time that; as long as,
etc." The policy suspended is merely lulled, is not a dead policy or
an ended policy, but suspended during the time the violation exists. If
the violation is removed, the policy then revives to its original effect.4
The court further follows its original decision, holding that the pol-
icy in question was "entire and indivisible."' This means that where
the property is so situated that the risk on one item cannot be affected
without affecting the risk on the other item or items, the policy should
be regarded as entire and indivisible. This same principle is followed
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Capps v. National Union Ins. Co., 149
N. E. 249, numerous authorities cited in the third paragraph of the
opinion.
It was argued that within R. S. Sec. 209.06, paragraph 2; "No war-
ranty incorporated in a contract of insurance relating to any fact prior
to a loss shall defeat or void such policy . . . .unless such breach
existed at the time of the loss," the other insurance provision of the
policy was a warranty, and as such, controlled and precluded the de-
fendant's defense of other insurance. Also, that said Sec. 209.06.
paragraph 2, was in conflict with the other insurance provision of the
standard policy, Sec. 203.01. The court points out that the other in-
surance provision is not a warranty, but a mere suspension of liability,
and also quotes Clement on Insurance, bk. 2, p. 136
, 
the term warranty
2 Gnat v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 274, 167 N.W. 250.
'Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Jackson (Ga.), 131 S.E. 539.
'Hinntan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 159 N.W.; Schumitsch v.
American Ins. Co., 48 Wis. 26, 3 N.E. 595; Dohlantry v. Blue Mounds Ins. Co.,
83 Wis. 181, 53 N.W. 448; Worachek v. New Denmark Mutual Home F. Ins.
Co., 102 Wis. 8I, 78 N.W. 165; Burr v. Gernan Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 76, 54 N.W.
22; Carey v. German-American Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 80, 54 N.W. 18; Blooner v.
Cicero Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 183 Wis. 407, 198 N.W. 287.
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is defined: "A warranty in an insurance contract is a statement made
therein by the insured, which is susceptible of no construction other
than that the parties mutually intended that the policy should not be
binding unless such statement be literally true," explaining that the
warranty definition does not reveal a statement which must be literally
true to entitle the insured to recover, and that the provisions of the
policy set out what is necessary to authorize other contracts of in-
surance, "requires an agreement in writing, added to the policy."6 The
Wisconsin court since the first enactment of the standard fire policy,
has always held its provision cannot be legally waived except in the
manner provided by the terms of the policy, "in writing, added to the
policy." The court also points out that the 1917 standard policy was
enacted subsequent to Sec. 209.o6, and if any conflict existed between
the two, then the later enactment would prevail over the former, but
says. "as shovin, there is no conflict between the statutes."
It is further argued that the phrase, "whether valid or not," of the
other insurance provision, was unintended; and in a long discourse on
the subject of "other insurance" conditions, its purpose and the purpose
of the legislature in the enactment of the standard policy, it is stated
this enactment creates a public policy directed against over insurance
and to remove temptation of incendiarism, and that the inclusion of
the words, 'whether valid or not,' "relieved the Insurance Company
from the burden of proving the validity of the other insurance."7
The court emphasizes that one of the principal objects of the enact-
ment in the standard fire policy and the other insurance provision con-
tained therein "is intended to create a situation in which the insured
shall bear a part of the risk, in order to stimulate care and diligence in
the protection of the property."
In September, 1926, the Theresa Company had levied an assessment
against policy holders including the plaintiff. Its by-laws provided if
the policy holder for sixty days after receiving the notice of assess-
ment, failed to pay, he shall 'forfeit and lose his rights' in the company.
The plaintiff notified of said assessment, the amount thereof, failed
and neglected for more than sixty days to pay the same. Shortly
after the loss the plaintiff sent the Theresa Company the amount of the
assessment and the Theresa Company returned an amount proportional
to the amount of its insurance on destroyed property to the amount
of the property undestroyed. Plaintiff asserted that the nonpayment
"Stillnan v. North River Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 204, 212 N.W. 67; Welch v.
Fire Assoc., 120 Wis. 456, 98 N.W. 227.
TPhoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Copeland (Ala.), 8 So. 48; Donogh v. Farmners'
Fire Ins. Co. (Mich.), 62 N.W. 721; Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Hulnan, 92
Ii. 145; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lamar (11d.), 7 N.E. 241; Clement on Insurance
Book 2, p. 104.
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of the Theresa assessment rendered the Theresa policy void, and being
void, constituted no other insurance at the time of the loss within
the meaning of defendant's policy. Construing "forfeit and lose his
rights" with R. S. Sec. 202.11 (3) and Sec. 202.13, the court holds that
the nonpayment of the assessment merely suspended the Theresa pol-
icy, that as an invalid policy at the time of the loss, it was other in-
surance "whether valid or not" within the defendant's policy. And
that the statute, Sec. 202.11 and 202.13 sets out the manner in which
a member of a mutual company may withdraw, i.e. by notice and
surrendering the policy "with a request for its cancellation written
thereon." Evidently the court makes a wide distinguishment between
a policy that is merely suspended and one that is ended-a suspended
policy is an invalid policy, while an !ended policy is of no force what-
ever.
The by-law, "forfeit and lose his rights" is construed with Sec.
202.11 (3) as a purpose of stimulating the payment of the assessments.
The local agent informed of the loss, notified the defendant, and the
defendant's adjuster shortly thereafter visited the premises with a view
to adjusting the loss. Informed of the existence of the Theresa policy,
comparing the items therein, with the defendant's. policy, the adjuster
ascertaining these facts, requested plaintiff to procure a list of valua-
tion of personal property destroyed in the fire, which the plaintiff fur-
nished. During negotiations, plaintiff and adjuster signed a 'non-
waiver' agreement, which reserved both the question of waiver and
liability under defendant's policy. The adjuster made report to the
defendant company, and defendant then examined the insured under
oath in accordance with the examination under oath provision of the
policy. Defendant then denied liability. This act and conduct on the
part of the defendant and its adjuster was assigned as a waiver of its
right to take advantage of the other insurance defense interposed, that
the defendant was estopped, that the policy was suspended, or plain-
tiff had violated any of the conditions of defendant's policy. In de-
ciding this issue, the court refers to lines 78 to 88 inc. of the standard
policy, on the subject of waiver8 held that waiver of the policy must be
"in writing added thereto." Reference is then made to the 'non-waiver'
agreement, and it is held a valid and legal document, and not, as the
trial court said, a "jug handled agreement," and that not only pursuant
to the provisions of the policy but also the 'non-waiver' agreement, "no
legal waiver of the defense interposed was effectuated." Lines 151 to
153 inc., are then quoted, "The insured, as often as may be reasonably
required, shall exhibit to any person designated by this company all that
'Spohn v. Johnson, 19o Wis. 446, 209 N.W. 725; Stillnan v. North River Ins.
Co., 192 Wis. 204, 212 N.W. 67.
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remains of any property herein described, and submit to examinations
under oath by any person named by this company, and subscribe the
same," and the purpose of this provision is that it "furnishes reliable
evidence to the company with respect to the actual loss, and as to all
the facts and circumstances involved in and surrounding the loss," and
it is held that the examination and investigation are contemplated by
the express provision of the statutory policy, and are a part of the
legislative agreement. This wording clearly sustains the standard pol-
icy provision. The court says that if under the facts detailed, the de-
fendant was estopped, then the standard form of policy "would serve
the purpose of a snare to entrap the insurance company into a waiver,"
and says, "such is not the case." Oshkosh Match Works v. Manchester
Fire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 510, is cited as sustaining the right of the Insur-
ance Company to an examination under oath of the insured after loss,
and without waiver of its rights in so doing.9
Prior to the adoption of the Wisconsin standard fire policy, the con-
ducting of an examination under oath was held as a waiver. Oshkosh
Gas Light Co. v. Germania Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 54. In the enactment of
the standard fire policy the rule changed.9
EDWARD S. FOLTZ, JR.
Husband and Wife; Liability of Wife's Estate for Expense of
Last Sickness; Funeral
Lichtenberger v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 222 N.W. 218.
While the deceased, Nellie Cox' Phalen, was suffering from her last
sickness, her sister, one Jane Lichtenberger, was requested by the hus-
band of the deceased to perform the services of a nurse, under the
promise that Mr. and Mrs. Phalen would pay her well therefor. The
services were performed and subsequent to the death of the deceased,
claiment filed her bill, which was allowed by the lower court. From
this decision an appeal is taken. Counsel for the trust company con-
tends that this debt is not properly chargeable to the estate of the
deceased because it was not her debt but the debt of the husband.
On the other hand, claimant's counsel contends that the debt became
properly chargeable to the wife's estate, citing Schneider v. Estate of
Breier, 129 Wis. 441 as their authority for such contention.
Section 313.16 Wis. Stat. reads: "If, after the amount of the claims
against any estate shall have been ascertained by the court,...." Inter-
preting this statute, the court says that the claims against any estate
are those allowed by the court. This interpretation does not give to
*Aetna Ins. Co. v. Itule (Ariz.), 218 Pac. 99o; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v.
George, 153 Pac. 116; Shapiro v. Security Ins. Co., 152 N.E. 37o, are also cited
in support of the same rule.
